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INTRODUCTION
Visual masking has, for a considerable amount of time, 
proven to be a powerful tool for investigating the tem-
poral  dynamics  of  visual  perception.  One  prominent 
method within this research tradition is to demonstrate 
that  although  there  is  no  conscious  perception  of  a 
masked stimulus (a ‘prime’), the features or presence 
of the masked information may influence sensorimo-
tor (e.g., Klotz & Neumann, 1999), attentional (e.g., 
Jaśkowski, van der Lubbe, Schlotterbeck, & Verleger, 
2002), semantic (e.g., Kiefer, 2002, this volume), and 
mental operations (e.g., Mattler, 2003). However, as 
pointed out, among others, by Schmidt and Vorberg 
(2006; Schmidt, this volume), the requirement that 
awareness of the masked information is perfectly ab-
sent is both difficult to prove and to achieve. Schmidt 
and Vorberg advocate a technique in  which  one at-
tempts to demonstrate that an independent variable 
influences awareness and other measures of process-
ing differently, instead of trying to prove that a prime 
is completely masked.
Yet,  non–chance  perception  of  the  prime,  or  ‘re-
sidual awareness’, is more than a problem for masking 
research. Whether a masked stimulus leaves traces in 
AbSTRACT
Visual backward masking is frequently used to 
study the temporal dynamics of visual percep-
tion. These dynamics may include the temporal 
features  of  conscious  percepts,  as  suggested, 
for  instance,  by  the  asynchronous–updating 
model  (Neumann,  1982)  and  perceptual–re-
touch  theory  (bachmann,  1994).  These  mod-
els predict that the perceptual latency of a vi-
sual  backward  mask  is  shorter  than  that  of  a 
like reference stimulus that was not preceded 
by a masked stimulus. The prediction has been 
confirmed  by  studies  using  temporal–order 
judgments:  For  certain  asynchronies  between 
mask  and  reference  stimulus,  temporal–order 
reversals  are  quite  frequent  (e.g.  Scharlau,  &   
Neumann, 2003a). However, it may be argued 
that these reversals were due to a response bias 
in favour of the mask rather than true temporal-
perceptual effects. I introduce two measures for 
assessing latency effects that (1) are not prone 
to such a response bias, (2) allow to quantify the 
latency gain, and (3) extend the perceptual evi-
dence from order reversals to duration/interval 
perception,  that  is,  demonstrate  that  the  per-
ceived interval between a mask and a reference 
stimulus may be shortened as well as prolonged 
by the presence of a masked stimulus. Conse-
quences for theories of visual masking such as 
asynchronous–updating,  perceptual–retouch, 
and reentrant models are discussed.
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perception – and how to assess them – is a research 
question in its own right. For example, features of a 
masked stimulus may migrate to the mask (feature 
inheritance), and the spatio-temporal conditions under 
which total masking, feature inheritance, or other phe-
nomena dominate allows insights into the time course 
of visual information processing (e.g., Herzog, Fahle, & 
Koch, 2001; Herzog, Koch, & Fahle, 2001). 
In the present paper, I propose to study whether the 
masked prime influences temporal perception. Previous 
studies  have  indicated  that  priming  alters  temporal 
features of the consciously perceived mask: Given a 
pair of a masking stimulus and a reference stimulus 
that is not preceded by a prime, the mask appears to 
begin earlier. That is, if observers, for instance, report 
which of two simultaneous stimuli – mask and refer-
ence – is the earlier one, they will tend to choose the 
mask, not the reference (perceptual latency priming or 
PLP; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003a).
Within the framework of masking research, PLP is 
not  an  accidental  finding.  It  had  been  predicted  by 
two models which aimed at explaining metacontrast 
masking, perceptual retouch (Bachmann, 1984) and 
the asynchronous–updating model (Neumann, 1982). 
Both ascribe metacontrast (and PLP) to the interaction 
and asynchrony of two processing mechanisms, one 
specific, the other more general. They differ, however, 
with respect to pinpointing these mechanisms. 
According  to  the  asynchronous-updating  model 
(AUM),  the  onset  of  a  stimulus  causes  two  parallel 
visual processes: feature/object coding of basic visual 
information in spatially addressable maps on the one 
hand, and allocation of attention on the other hand. 
Whereas the first process is fast and reflects stimu-
lus changes quickly, the second process is slow, lag-
ging behind the information that is represented in the 
feature maps. Yet, it is a necessary precondition for 
conscious perception. To put it very generally, during 
the shift of attention towards the prime, the prime’s 
codes on the level of spatial maps are overwritten by 
the mask’s codes and thus prevented from attention-
related processing. This model is able to explain why 
metacontrast masking can be reduced if attention is 
pre–cued towards the location of the prime–mask se-
quence (Enns, 2004; Tata, 2002) or when primes are 
attention-grabbing stimuli (Shelley-Tremblay & Mack, 
1999), and conversely is increased if a distractor di-
verts attention away from the prime for longer prime-
mask intervals (50 to 100 ms; Neumann, 1978). 
According to the AUM, the most characteristic pat-
tern of metacontrast masking, the U–shaped masking 
curve, is due to two separate mechanisms. Within the 
descending branch where masking increases with the 
temporal  interval  between  prime  and  mask,  tempo-
ral integration of prime and mask dominates, that is, 
they are perceived as a single event. Masking here is 
due to factors such as brightness summation. In the 
ascending branch, with masking decreasing, temporal 
differentiation dominates. Here, masking is related to 
attentional factors (Neumann, 1978). Reeves (1982, 
1986) has provided further evidence for this decompo-
sition of the masking curve into two mechanisms, and 
the idea has recently reappeared in masking research 
(von Mühlenen, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2006). 
In  the  AUM,  PLP  is  a  by–product  of  the  atten-
tion  shift  triggered  by  the  prime:  Attention-related 
processing of the mask can begin earlier, because the 
attention shift towards the location of the prime–mask 
sequence has already begun or been completed. This 
earlier beginning results in perceptual latency priming 
(Neumann, 1982).
In the perceptual–retouch model, the two asynchro-
nous processes are fast specific encoding of informa-
tion in the visual cortex (features, conjunctions/objects 
and intermodal binding), and slow nonspecific activa-
tion of these codes via retino-thalamic and thalamo-
cortical  pathways,  which  modulates  specific  afferent 
processes and is necessary for conscious availability of 
contents (see, e.g., Baars, 1995). Nonspecific process-
ing or perceptual retouch modulates the specific codes 
in such a way that they are upgraded into conscious 
experience  (Bachmann,  1994).  Because  nonspecific 
activation trails specific processes by about 50 to 80 
ms  (Bachmann,  1994),  upon  its  arrival,  the  codes 
of the prime and the mask will vary – depending on 
priming/masking  SOA  (stimulus  onset  asynchrony) 
– in their strength, which in turn determines whether 
they will be upgraded or not. With short priming SOAs, 
prime and mask are upgraded as an integrated per-
cept because both are similarly strong. With medium 
priming  SOAs  around  50  ms,  the  mask’s  codes  are 
strong enough for upgrading while those of the prime 
have already decayed, and with large priming SOAs, 
both stimuli are upgraded separately. This explains the 
U-shaped function of metacontrast by a single mecha-
nism.
PLP  is  included  in  the  perceptual-retouch  model 
via the beginning of the upgrading or retouch process: 
Because this process begins earlier for a primed mask 
compared to an unprimed stimulus, the mask’s per-
ceived onset is pre–dated. Processing of the mask on 
the  level  of  upgrading  takes  advantage  of  the  non-
specific activation triggered by the prime (Bachmann, 
1999).Perceptual consequences of masked information
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As  mentioned  above,  latency  facilitation  of  the 
mask, which was expected on the basis of these two 
models,  has  indeed  been  found  in  several  studies 
which compared the perceptual latency of the mask 
and  a  reference  stimulus  in  temporal–order  judg-
ments  (Neumann,  1982;  Neumann,  Esselmann,  & 
Klotz, 1993; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003a; Steglich 
& Neumann, 2000). Several features of PLP, such as 
its  time  course  (Scharlau,  Ansorge,  &  Horstmann, 
2006), its independence of sensorimotor processing 
(Scharlau,  2004),  its  independence  of  prime-target 
similarity (Scharlau & Neumann, 2003a), and the pos-
sibility of top-down influences (Scharlau & Ansorge, 
2003) accord well with the attention-related explana-
tion of the asynchronous–updating model (for a sum-
mary of the empirical data see Scharlau, in press). 
However, it is still not clear whether mechanisms such 
as decision–level processing or the establishment of 
judgment criteria contribute to PLP. This is mainly due 
to a shortcoming of the usual method of measuring 
latency facilitation, temporal–order judgment (TOJ).
TOJ is a very natural method to assess PLP: With 
its help, the latency of the primed stimulus is com-
pared directly to the latency of an unprimed stimu-
lus. TOJ data allow quantifying the latency gain and 
measure discrimination accuracy simultaneously (e.g., 
Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). A disadvantage of the TOJ 
method is that it does not provide easy means to dis-
tinguish  between  ‘true’  latency  effects  and  criterion 
effects (for further shortcomings, see Ulrich, 1987).
Several authors have argued that evidence in favour 
of PLP (or similar attentional effects) may alternatively 
be caused by a non-attentional change in response or 
decision criteria, that is, a response bias (Jaśkowski, 
1993; Pashler, 1998). In the following, I will shortly 
explain the response–bias argument, describe how it 
has been addressed in earlier research and point out 
the shortcomings of these earlier attempts. Then I will 
propose two related methods to assess PLP that are 
less prone to response bias. The three tasks are then 
studied jointly in two experiments. 
The response–bias argument 
In general, the response-bias account of PLP argues 
that  if  in  doubt,  observers  may  tend  to  ascribe  a 
response  or  judgment  criterion  –  in  the  TOJ,  the 
criterion “being the first stimulus” – to the primed 
stimulus or the mask. This objection was first raised 
by Jaśkowski (1993), although restricted to condi-
tions in which the actual interval between the stimuli 
was so short that order was difficult to perceive and 
the observer was uncertain about it. However, one 
may,  as  Pashler  did  (1998)  in  a  review  of  cueing 
research, generalise such doubts: Observers may in 
general tend to respond in favour of an attended or 
primed stimulus. 
Shore, Spence, and Klein (2001) studied this in a 
temporal–order  judgment  task  with  attentional  cue-
ing. They compared latency facilitation1 in judgments 
with opposite temporal criteria (“first” and “second” 
judgments) and defined true latency facilitation as the 
mean of these two conditions and response bias as 
half the difference between the two conditions. With 
endogenous cueing by centrally presented arrows they 
found  that  the  response  bias  was  approximately  as 
large as the latency facilitation itself (13 vs. 17 ms). 
With  exogenous  cueing,  the  same  response  bias  of   
13 ms was present, but small compared with a large 
latency benefit (61 ms). In a similar study, although 
with  masked  primes,  I  found  no  response  bias 
(Scharlau, 2004).
Thus, the question of response bias in latency facili-
tation is still unsettled. First, masked primes may not 
elicit a bias. Further, the study of Shore et al. (2001) 
might  be  in  need  of  replication  because  there  were 
only three observers per condition, and the PSS (the 
point of subjective simultaneity) was calculated from 
only two data points on the psychometric distribution, 
a procedure falling short of psychophysical methods 
which estimate the parameters from the whole distri-
bution (Finney, 1971; Thurstone, 1948). 
In the present study, I attempt to test methods 
to  measure  PLP  which  narrow  possible  influences 
of a response bias. As explained, a response bias 
may interfere in PLP experiments because observ-
ers give a two-alternative forced-choice judgment, 
and attention is primed to either one of two alter-
native features (locations or stimuli). A dependent 
measure that consists of more than two alternative 
responses precludes such a response bias because 
it prevents a criterion from being ascribed to the 
primed stimulus. 
There are different possibilities for realising such 
a method. Shore et al. (2001) proposed using judg-
ment times. They reasoned that the most difficult 
order judgments should yield the longest judgment 
times. The peak of judgment times thus indicates 
perceived  simultaneity.  Indeed  they  found  that 
judgment times peaked approximately at the tem-
poral intervals that defined the PSS.  Further,  the 
peaks were shifted in accordance with latency fa-
cilitation, that is, the direction of the peak shift was 
the same as that of the PSS shift. The method has, 244
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however,  disadvantages:  In  the  judgment–peak 
analysis, a single data point (peak judgment time) 
is taken as the index of PSS. This method falls short 
of psychophysical threshold analysis which is used 
to estimate the PSS from temporal order judgments 
(see, e.g., Finney, 1971): The precision with which 
the peak is determined depends on an appropriate 
choice of temporal intervals that are used as the 
independent variable. Furthermore, only the peak 
is extracted from the data. By comparison, thresh-
old analysis yields a measure of discrimination per-
formance (difference limen, DL) besides PSS. Most 
importantly, if the distributions do not peak sharply 
it is arguable whether any single point on this dis-
tribution marks the PSS. This is evident in the study 
by Shore et al.: Although there was clear evidence 
for latency facilitation in the psychometric distribu-
tions and PSS data, the peaks in judgment times 
were poorly localized because of shallow slopes.
One further disadvantage of peak analysis may be 
added. Judgment times are often highly variable, and 
this variability renders statistical evaluation difficult. 
Further, either correct and incorrect judgments or cor-
rect judgments only can be tested. PLP is by definition 
accompanied by a change of error rate which speaks in 
favour of using both correct and incorrect judgments. 
However, errors may result from multiple causes be-
sides latency facilitation (cf. Reason, 1990). Including 
them will thus further increase variance and compli-
cate statistical testing.
Alternative methods 
In the following, I describe two alternative methods of 
measuring latency facilitation that avoid the shortcom-
ings discussed in the previous paragraphs. They are 
meant to prevent a response bias, allow for computing 
parameters of temporal perception which are compa-
rable to the parameters of psychophysical threshold 
analysis and permit statistical treatment, and extend 
the evidence of PLP to the perception of duration. Two 
experiments each compare three tasks: temporal or-
der judgment (TOJ), interval reproduction, and inter-
val scaling. 
The TOJ serves as a comparison for the two novel 
methods. It was used in all of the earlier studies on 
PLP. Observers judge which of two visual targets ap-
pears first. In order to test the proposal by Shore et al. 
(2001), I will also analyse the judgment times. 
In  the  reproduction  and  scaling  parts  –  the  two 
new methods –, observers judge the duration of the 
perceived interval between the two targets’ onsets by 
manual reproduction and by a graphic scale, respec-
tively. Latency facilitation by the prime should lead to 
a prolongation of the perceived interval if the prime 
precedes the first target because here, PLP speeds up 
the processing of the target that marks the beginning 
of the interval. Conversely, intervals will be shortened 
if the prime precedes the second target because at-
tention now speeds up the target that defines the end 
of the interval. 
The TOJ task is a classical psychophysical method 
for estimating the thresholds of temporal perception. 
The  scaling  task  may  be  conceived  of  as  a  method 
of direct scaling (cf. Stevens, 1957); the estimate is, 
however, given graphically and not numerically. The 
reproduction task is a motor task whose requirements 
are different both from judgment and direct scaling 
and  which  falls  outside  the  scope  of  psychophysics. 
These three tasks are sufficiently dissimilar to under-
line the generality of PLP – provided that they yield 
converging evidence for PLP.
The two experiments use two different priming in-
tervals (the interval between the onset of the prime 
and the onset of the mask), 37.5 and 67.5 ms. Both 
the  AUM  and  the  perceptual–retouch  theory  predict 
that  PLP  increases  with  priming  interval  within  this 
range (Scharlau et al., 2006). 
   
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1b
Method
Participants
Ten student participants gave their informed consent 
in Experiment 1a, and 11 participants in Experiment 
1b. Each received € 15. The most accurate participant 
in each block gained an additional payment of € 3. All 
participants had normal or fully corrected vision.
General Design and Apparatus
Each experiment consisted of three blocks (TOJ, 
reproduction  and  scaling)  run  in  random  order  on 
separate days. Dark grey stimuli were presented on 
a light grey background on a 17 in. colour monitor. 
Participants  sat  in  a  dimly  lit  room,  with  their  line 
of gaze straight ahead and viewing distance fixed at 
60  cm  by  a  chin  rest.  They  responded  via  a  serial 
mouse.
Stimuli
In each trial, two targets were displayed, a square 
and a diamond. The pair appeared in horizontal align-
ment. It was always presented in the upper part of 
the screen, because in the scaling task, the response Perceptual consequences of masked information
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device was presented in the lower part, and I wanted 
to  prevent  any  interaction  of  this  with  the  relevant 
targets. Edge length of the targets was 2.3° of visual 
angle. Eccentricity was 8.5°, that is, the target centre 
was 6° from the centre of the screen both in horizontal 
and vertical direction. In half of the trials, a smaller 
version of a target (a prime) preceded one of the tar-
gets; edge length of the prime was 1.7°. The prime 
was  visually  backward-masked  by  the  target  at  the 
same location (Klotz & Neumann, 1999). 
The targets were presented with temporal inter-
vals of –97.5 to +97.5 ms in steps of 15 ms (target 
SOAs, stimulus onset asynchronies). Negative num-
bers indicate that the primed target (or primed mask) 
preceded the unprimed target, and positive numbers 
denote that the unprimed target appeared first. (In 
trials without a prime, positive and negative numbers 
were assigned randomly while realising all the other 
variables equally often.) The priming SOA was 67.5 
ms in Experiment 1a and 37.5 ms in Experiment 1b. 
All stimuli had durations of 37.5 ms. There were 28 
conditions (2 priming conditions × 14 target SOAs; 
672 trials). The trials were presented with the method 
of constant stimuli.
Procedure
Participants fixated on the centre of the screen, 
marked  by  a  cross,  throughout  each  trial.  In  the 
TOJ part, they indicated which of the two shapes 
was perceived first. Half of the participants pressed 
the right button of a computer mouse if the dia-
mond  appeared  first,  and  the  left  button  if  the 
square was perceived first. For the other half, this 
assignment was reversed. The instruction empha-
sised accuracy.
In  the  reproduction  part,  participants  reproduced 
the perceived interval with the mouse buttons. They 
pressed the two mouse buttons corresponding to the 
succession of the two targets as exactly as possible. 
They used their two index fingers for the reproduction, 
beginning with the left index finger if the left target 
led the sequence, and with the right index finger if the 
right target was first. The time between the two click 
onsets was measured to the nearest millisecond yield-
ing the duration of the perceived interval.
In the scaling part, a horizontal ruler appeared in the 
lower half of the display (see Figure 1). Its ends were 
labelled ”very long” and ”very short”. The position of the 
labels varied randomly from trial to trial. Participants 
moved a marker on the ruler with the mouse and ad-
justed the interval they had perceived. The ruler was 
200 pixels long, and the relative position of the marker 
was measured. Participants were instructed to use the 
whole  length  of  the  slider  and  told  that  “very  long” 
meant “among the longest intervals presented”.
Before each part of the experiment, the participants 
practised the respective task. In these 28 trials, no 
primes  were  used.  Each  target  SOA  was  repeated 
twice in order to give the participants an occasion to 
learn the range of intervals. A trained student experi-
menter gave occasional feedback if he or she saw that 
the participants did not use the upper part of the scale 
in the scaling task or produced very large intervals in 
the reproduction task. I did not use formal feedback 
because preliminary experiments with the same me-
thods  had  consistently  shown  that  the  participants 
found all three tasks natural and very easy, an impres-
sion confirmed by the data. 
Computation, parameters and 
statistical analysis
Binary psychophysical judgments are typically distrib-
uted as a cumulative normal or a logistic function which 
Figure 1.
Succession of events in a sample trial of the experiments. The stimuli are not drawn to scale. Depicted is a scaling trial with 
the ruler in the lower part of the screen.246
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is defined by two parameters, the point of subjective 
simultaneity (PSS), and discrimination accuracy (DL; 
see Figure 2 for an illustration). The PSS is the location 
on the abscissa at which the two judgments are equal-
ly likely, that is, the observers cannot decide about 
the temporal order. DL is defined as the interquartile 
range. From the data, the frequency of the judgment 
“unprimed stimulus first” was calculated, and PSS and 
DL were computed by logit analysis (Finney, 1971). 
Further, median judgment times were calculated for 
each SOA and priming condition.
The  scaling  and  reproduction  data  should  yield   
U-shaped distributions (see Figure 2). For illustration, 
consider  the  unprimed  trials.  The  minimum  interval 
Figure 2.
Distributions expected in the TOJ (left) and in the scaling and reproduction task (right). Solid lines depict data expected in 
unprimed trials, dotted lines depict data expected in primed trials. PLP is evident from a shift of the distribution towards the 
right. Parameters are indicated on the figures. For a more detailed description, see the text and Appendix A.
Figure 3.
Results of Experiment 1a. Priming SOA is 67.5 ms. Lines in the graphs for the reproduction and scaling tasks represent  
the approximated function and were computed using averaged parameters of the subjects and the function described in  
Appendix A.Perceptual consequences of masked information
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or duration should be perceived when the targets are 
simultaneous.  From  the  value  of  the  minimum,  the 
perceived interval should increase monotonically with 
the actual interval to some maximum value. Such a 
distribution can be approximated by a rational, non-
linear function with 4 parameters (see Appendix A for 
mathematical details). Parameter Lmin gives the loca-
tion of the minimum on the abscissa which is compa-
rable to the PSS. Recall that the PSS is the point of 
perceived simultaneity, which should be identical with 
minimum duration between the two targets; Lmin is the 
point of minimum duration. PLP should thus show up 
in a shift of Lmin. 
Parameter Dmin reflects the perceived duration of the 
minimum (y-value of the minimum). It has no equiva-
lence to psychometric analysis since there, the y-value 
of the PSS is by definition 0.5. By contrast, Dmin, the 
minimum duration perceived in a set of conditions, is 
not confined to a certain value or range. Parameter W 
is defined as the width of the opening of the U and pos-
sibly closely related to discrimination performance, that 
is, DL in classical psychophysical analysis (see Appendix 
A for a mathematical argument). Parameter C denotes 
the y-value against which the two branches of the U 
converge.  It  also  has  no  equivalent  in  psychometric 
analysis since there, it is assumed that the psychomet-
ric function converges towards 0 and 1. Median indi-
vidual scaling and reproduction results were calculated 
(excluding reproduced intervals longer than 1,000 ms) 
and, minimising least squares, the best-fitting function 
was approximated with Mathematica 4.1 (2001).
PSS and DL from the TOJ part, and each of the four 
parameters of the reproduction and scaling part were 
submitted to t-tests. PLP values (computed as PSS dif-
ferences between the primed and the unprimed condi-
tion for the TOJ part and as Lmin differences for the two 
other parts) were submitted to a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA with the factor task. Judgment times 
were  submitted  to  a  two-way  repeated-measures 
ANOVA including target SOA and priming as factors. 
If appropriate, degrees of freedom were corrected by 
the Greenhouse-Geisser-coefficient ε, and adjusted α 
values are reported (Hays, 1988).
Results
Experiment 1a: Priming interval of 67.5 ms
One participant always pressed the same button in 
the  TOJ  task;  his  data  were  not  analysed.  Figure  3 
gives the mean data. There is an obvious shift of the 
primed distributions in all tasks. Table 1 details the 
statistical results which are summed up below. 
 TOJ task. PSS were reliably shifted in favour of the 
primed stimulus (+48 ms compared with +1 ms in the 
unprimed condition). PLP thus was +47 ms. I did not 
find a significant influence of the prime on judgment 
Table 1.
Statistical results of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b. The first 6 rows give the t-tests of the parameters computed from the 
three tasks, the lower 2 rows the ANOVAs of the judgment times.
PSS / Lmin DL / W Dmin C 
1a, TOJ
t(9) = 16.26, 
p < .0001
t(9) <1
1a,  reproduction t(9) = 13.05, 
p < .0001
t(9) = 1.36, 
p = .21
t(9) = 1.2,
p = .26
t(9) = 1.32, 
p = .22
1a, scaling t(9) = 16.65, 
p < .0001
t(8) = 2.27, 
p = .053
t(9) = 4.61,
p < .01
t(9) = 1.12, 
p = .29
1b, TOJ t(10) = 7.12, 
p < .0001
t(10) < 1
1b, reproduction
t(10) = 14.9, 
p < .0001
t(9) = 1.9,  
p = .09
t(10) = 1.72,
p = .12
t(10) < 1
1b, scaling
t(10) = 11.41, 
p < .0001
t(9) = 2.05, 
p = .07
t(10) = 4.17,
p < .01
t(10) < 1
Target-SOA Priming interaction
1a, judgment times
F(13, 117) = 8.74, 
p < .001, 
MSE = 11407.3
F(1, 10) = 0.00, 
MSE = 3949.87
F(13, 117) = 2.76, 
p < .05, 
MSE = 4496.27
1b, judgment times
F(13, 130) = 7.99, 
p < .01, 
MSE = 1246.7
F(1, 10) = 0.06, 
MSE = 5587.07
F(13, 130) = 3.54,
p < .01, 
MSE = 3147.69248
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accuracy; mean DL was 34 ms. As expected, the judg-
ment times yielded a significant main effect of target 
SOA  and  an  interaction  of  priming  and  target  SOA. 
Judgment times peaked at +7.5 ms in the unprimed 
condition. The maximum in the primed condition was 
in the range of +37.5 to +67.5 ms, but shallow and 
double-peaked. The judgment times thus do not per-
mit easy or unambiguous estimation of the location of 
the PSS.
Reproduction  task.  As  expected,  the  repro-
duced  intervals  yielded  a  U-shaped  distribution 
(Figure 3). Also, a horizontal shift of the distribution 
in the primed condition is visible. Minimum location 
(Lmin) differed between the two conditions (0 ms in 
the unprimed and +46 ms in the primed condition). 
PLP thus was +46 ms. For W (average 47 ms), Dmin 
(average 70 ms), and C (average 249 ms), no sig-
nificant influence of the prime was found.2 In sum, a 
reliable influence of priming was found for the loca-
tion of the minimum only.
Scaling task. The statistical results were simi-
lar. Lmin was reliably influenced by priming (–2 vs. 
+32 ms) yielding PLP of +34 ms. W just failed to 
reach  significance  (average  66  ms).  Dmin  was  reli-
ably smaller in unprimed (9) than in primed trials 
(36). C was on average 181 ms and did not change 
with priming.3  In  addition  to  PLP,  the  scaling  task 
thus revealed a change in the perceived minimum 
duration.4
Comparison.  Individual  PLP  values  for  all  three 
parts were submitted to a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA which reached significance, F(2, 18) = 15.73,   
p  <  .001,  MSE  =  37.42.  Bonferroni  post-hoc  com-
parisons indicated that PLP was reliably smaller in the 
scaling task than in both other tasks, p < .05. Shore 
et al. suggested (2001) a method for computing true 
latency effects and response biases when comparing 
two  measures  which  are  influenced  by  a  response 
bias to different degrees: PLP is the mean of the two 
conditions, the response bias is estimated as half the 
difference between the two conditions. Applying this 
method, the response bias in the present experiment 
could be estimated as 6.5 ms and the true latency gain 
as 40.5 ms, comparing the TOJ and the scaling task. 
Figure 4.
Results of Experiment 1b. Priming SOA is 37.5 ms. Lines in the graphs for the reproduction and scaling tasks represent  
the approximated function and were computed using averaged parameters of the subjects and the function described in  
Appendix A.Perceptual consequences of masked information
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Comparison  of  TOJ  and  reproduction  yields  a  mar-
ginal response bias of 0.5 ms and a true PLP effect of   
46.5 ms. 
Experiment 1b: Priming interval of 37.5 ms
Experiment 1b was identical with Experiment 1a apart 
from  that  the  priming  SOA  was  reduced  to  37.5  ms.   
This  should  also  decrease  PLP  because  attention  as 
well as retouch has less time to operate. One partici-
pant was not able to discriminate order in the TOJ task 
(DL > 1,000 ms). His data were not analysed.
TOJ task. PSS varied with priming. PSS were +7 
and +39 ms, and PLP thus amounted to +32 ms. Mean 
DL was 24 ms. Judgment times yielded a significant 
main effect of target SOA and an interaction of prim-
ing and target SOA. They peaked shallowly at –7.5 to 
+7.5 ms in the unprimed condition, and at +22.5 to 
+37.5 ms in the primed conditions, again rendering an 
estimation of the PSS difficult.
Reproduction task. Lmin was 0 ms in the unprimed 
and +26 ms in the primed conditions yielding a reli-
able difference. W just failed to reach significance 
(44 vs. 51 ms) which was also true for Dmin (26 vs. 
35 ms). C did not vary with priming (average 213 ms). 
PLP  thus  was  found,  accompanied  by  a  change  in 
the duration of the minimum; a change in parameter 
W is indicated, but not established, by the present 
results.
Scaling task. The statistical results were similar. 
Lmin was 0 ms for the unprimed, and +20 ms for the 
primed  conditions  yielding  a  significant  difference. 
W again just failed to reach significance (42 vs. 62 
ms).  Dmin  was  influenced  by  priming  and  was  0  for 
the unprimed and 19 for the primed condition. C did 
not change with priming (average 167). This pattern 
closely resembles that of the reproduction part. PLP 
was again accompanied by changes in the perceived 
duration of the minimal interval.
Comparison.  Individual  PLP  values  for  all  three 
parts  were  submitted  to  a  one-way  repeated-meas-
ures  ANOVA  which  just  failed  to  reach  significance,   
F(2, 20) = 4.04, p = .06, MSE = 103.37. Using the 
proposal by Shore at al. (2001), we can estimate true 
PLP as 26/29 ms and response bias as 6/3 ms in the 
present experiment, for a comparison of TOJ with scal-
ing, and reproduction, respectively.
Comparison  across  priming  SOAs.  Individual 
PLP values were submitted to a two-way ANOVA in-
cluding  priming  SOA  as  a  between-subjects  factor 
and task as a within-subjects factor. Both were highly 
significant, priming SOA: F(1, 19) = 31.1, p < .0001,   
MSE  =  129.9,  task:  F(2,  19)  =  8.3,  p  <  .001,   
MSE  =  72.13.  The  interaction  was  also  significant,   
F(2, 38) = 5.77, p < .01, MSE = 416.51.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The  present  experiments  attempted  to  ascertain 
whether the possible facilitating influence of a masked 
prime on the temporal perception of the mask – pre-
dicted by two explanations of metacontrast masking 
and proven in numerous studies – is due to a response 
bias. New methods – the analysis of judgment times 
of the TOJ, interval reproduction, and interval scaling 
– allow the disposal of weaknesses in earlier attempts 
to address the response–bias question. I also aimed at 
providing phenomenal measures of the influence of a 
masked prime on the temporal features of the mask. 
In the following, I will (1) summarise the evidence 
against the response–bias explanation of PLP from the 
present,  and  other,  experiments,  followed  by  (2)  a 
closer look at the possible influence of priming on the 
parameters Dmin and W of the scaling and reproduc-
tion tasks. Finally, (3), I will return to the question 
as to how the influence of the masked prime on the 
temporal features of the mask can be integrated into 
models of masking.
The role of response bias
PLP was found in all three tasks which were com-
pared in the present study. This finding makes clear 
that PLP cannot be explained fully by a response bias, 
as, for instance, Pashler’s argument suggests (Pashler, 
1998) by reason that such a response bias cannot op-
erate in the reproduction and scaling tasks. However, 
it would be too far–reaching to conclude that response 
biases play no role at all in PLP. By contrast, there are 
some findings which might be interpreted as biases: 
In Experiment 1a, PLP was numerically (though not 
statistically) smaller in scaling than in the two other 
tasks; in the second experiment, the difference reached 
significance and also appeared (though not reliably) 
in the comparison of the reproduction and TOJ tasks. 
These differences might be the consequence of a bias 
which enlarges the effect of the prime in the TOJ task, 
but not in the other two tasks. At present, however, 
this is a tentative assumption because the difference 
was reliable only in one of two experiments for the 
scaling task and could not be proven statistically for 
the reproduction task. 
On the other hand, besides this small and unre-
liable  possible  bias  effect,  the  present  experiments 
prove  a  genuine  and  large  PLP  effect.  Earlier  data 
support  this  conclusion  (Scharlau,  2004).  In  that 250
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study I followed the logic of Shore et al. (2001) and 
changed the criterion between blocks, that is, I had 
the observers report which stimulus was the first one 
in one block and which was the second one in an-
other block. I did not find a difference in PLP between 
blocks, that is, there was no bias, even numerically. 
This was in contrast to Shore et al., who reported a 
small criterion effect. I suggest that this bias was not 
found because masked primes afford less opportunity 
for  decision-level  influences  as  compared  to  visible 
cues, which were used by Shore and coworkers.5 If 
this interpretation could be corroborated, it would be 
a general argument in favour of the use of masked 
primes or cues.
New effects of priming on temporal  
perception
The novel methods hinted at additional effects of a 
masked prime: increases of W, and of Dmin. W relates 
to the width of the opening of the U-shaped function, 
Dmin  is  the  y-value  assigned  to  the  minimum  of  the 
function. The increase of Dmin is proven only for the 
scaling task, the enlargement of W was reliable only in 
the scaling task of Experiment 1b and failed to reach 
significance  for  the  reproduction  tasks.  Might  these 
data add to the explanation of PLP? I suggest that this 
question should be carefully considered.
In the TOJ data of the present experiments, dis-
crimination accuracy (DL) was the same in primed and 
unprimed trials. This is in accordance with earlier stud-
ies, in which a change of DL was a very rare exception 
(e.g.  Scharlau,  2002,  2004;  Scharlau  &  Neumann, 
2003a, b). PLP assessed by the TOJ thus is confined to 
a PSS shift. If this also were true in the novel tasks, 
the only change between the unprimed and the primed 
distribution should be a horizontal displacement. By 
contrast,  the  distribution  of  reproduced  and  scaled 
intervals was seemingly flattened in primed trials (see 
Figures 3 and 4). (It may be noted in passing that this 
accords qualitatively with the judgment times, whose 
distribution was also less pronounced in primed com-
pared to unprimed trials.) 
This apparent flattening is reflected in two quantita-
tive findings: Parameter W tends to increase in primed 
trials, that is, the U-opening is wider. An enlargement 
is also found for parameter Dmin. C, however, the axis of 
convergence, does not differ in primed and unprimed 
trials. 
The  small  increase  in  W  might  indicate  reduced 
discrimination  accuracy.  Note  however,  that  the  re-
lationship of W to accuracy is not simple. A large W   
(a very broad opening) indeed indicates poor accuracy. 
By contrast, a small W (a very narrow opening) does 
not indicate excellent accuracy but rather a categori-
cal use of the response alternatives: small perceived 
intervals within a small range of short SOAs and large, 
only slightly changing perceived intervals with other, 
more extreme SOAs. However, the numerical range of 
the W values found in the present experiments (which 
were neither very large nor very small) possibly indi-
cates a decrease of accuracy, that is, the observers 
were  less  good  in  their  duration  judgments  when  a 
prime was present. 
Since  the  decreased  accuracy  was  only  a  trend, 
it  should  be  interpreted  cautiously.  Future  research 
might aim at corroborating this finding and investigate 
why it is absent in the classical TOJ task. For instance, 
it could be tested whether TOJ performance is so easy 
that the prime’s presence is not detrimental for tem-
poral perception. One likely reason for this argument is 
that spatial clues are useful for TOJ. For instance, par-
ticipants may have utilised apparent motion (Kolers, 
1972) for their judgments of temporal order (Allik & 
Kreegipuu, 1998). Primes provide spatial information 
and  thus  might  have  fostered  temporal  judgments. 
The same spatial clues are less beneficial for the other 
tasks, which require estimating durations: The dura-
tion cannot (or, to be very cautious, can less easily) 
be inferred from apparent motion. That is, a possible 
detrimental influence of the prime, which may have 
impaired duration estimation, might have been com-
pensated for by the spatial clues in the TOJ. 
Let us now turn to the parameter Dmin. I interpreted 
it as the perceived duration of the minimum interval. 
In unprimed conditions, Dmin was close to zero in the 
scaling task, and only slightly larger in the reproduction 
task. Dmin was reliably increased in the primed trials of 
the scaling task, and numerically (though not statisti-
cally) enlarged in the reproduction task. Interpreted in 
perceptual terms: There was some minimal perceived 
interval, but its perceived duration was different from 
zero in the primed trials.6 
This  latter  interpretation  entails  an  interesting 
hypothesis:  None  of  the  durations  perceived  in  the 
primed  trials  seems  to  be  something  like  “subjec-
tive simultaneity”. Subjective simultaneity of the two 
targets should result in a perceived interval of zero. 
I suppose that the increase in Dmin indicates that si-
multaneity is only rarely registered in primed trials. 
There is always an additional onset, that of the prime, 
and some information about this extra onset may be 
available and foster the impression of non–simultane-
ity. This explanation accords well with earlier experi-
ments which showed that observers use an additional Perceptual consequences of masked information
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judgment “simultaneous/unclear” less often in primed 
than unprimed sequences (Scharlau, 2004; Scharlau et 
al., 2006). By contrast, the TOJ task does not require 
the observers to process the duration of the perceived 
interval, and it is useless for the two-alternative forced-
choice judgment to register simultaneity. This reading 
of the data dovetails with temporal perception mod-
els, which incorporate simultaneity or synchrony as a 
stand-alone  category  in  addition  to  temporal  orders, 
for  example,  Jaśkowski’s  (1991)  two-stage  model  of 
order perception.
It is important to note that two–alternative forced–
choice judgments (as used in the TOJ task) are not apt 
to detect such changes in temporal perception because 
the PSS is by definition the target SOA at which the two 
judgments are equally likely. In addition to three–alter-
native forced–choice judgments (including a “simultane-
ous/unclear” alternative; Scharlau et al., 2006), the two 
methods tested in the present study provide a method 
which is sensitive enough to detect such changes.
If my reading of the Dmin data is correct, we should 
ask whether Lmin and possibly also PSS should be inter-
preted as the point of subjective simultaneity as clas-
sical  psychophysical  theory  assumes  (cf.  Woodworth 
&  Schlosberg,  1961).  They  might  instead  indicate  a 
point of maximal uncertainty. The shallow peaks of the 
judgment-time distributions corroborate such an inter-
pretation: The elevation of judgment times marks the 
interval of uncertainty, but not the PSS.
PLP and models of masking
Let me now turn to the final question: How might the 
present data contribute to the understanding of mask-
ing? To sum the findings up in one sentence, a masked 
prime  influenced  the  perceived  temporal  features  of 
the mask. At present, two types of explanations can 
integrate this finding, an inheritance explanation and 
two–process models. 
Inheritance denotes a process by which figural fea-
tures of the prime are transferred to the mask (see, 
e.g., Werner, 1935, for some examples). Herzog and 
coworkers have demonstrated inheritance for a vernier 
offset of the prime (e.g., Herzog, Fahle, & Koch, 2001; 
Herzog, Koch, & Fahle, 2001). Such a mechanism might 
also operate in the temporal domain and transfer the 
perceived onset of the prime to an object–level repre-
sentation of the mask. As yet, inheritance models do 
not include temporal information as an explicitly coded 
feature, but they also do not preclude it. Besides the 
present data, at least one further study has found in-
heritance of subthreshold temporal information (Elliott, 
Shi, & Sürer, in press). 
Perceived time could also be part of object–level rep-
resentations in reentrant processing, which has been 
suggested as an explanation of masking, for example 
by Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink (2000). Latency facilita-
tion of the mask suggests that the prime’s temporal 
information survives reentrant overwriting of the con-
tent of these object–level representations. It might be 
noted  in  passing  that  this  hypothesis  would  resolve 
an ambiguity in the object–substitution (Di Lollo et al., 
2000) or object–updating (Enns, 2002; Moore & Enns, 
2004) account: Some authors suggest that detection 
of inconsistencies between the higher-level interpreta-
tion initiated by the prime and the later input of the 
mask causes abolishment of the initial ‘object token’ of 
the prime (Jiang & Chun, 2001), whereas others imply 
that object files are updated rather than created anew 
(Lleras & Moore, 2003). PLP might be interpreted as 
showing that temporal information of the prime persists 
throughout reentrant updating. Thus, the hypothesis of 
Lleras and Moore fits better with the present evidence.
The explanations from feature inheritance and from 
reentrant  processing  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Far 
from  it:  Feature  inheritance  and  related  phenomena 
such  as  masking  might  be  by–products  of  reentrant 
processing (Hamker, 2006). Hamker (this volume) has 
further shown that feedback loops may be sufficient 
preconditions for finding orientation inheritance. More 
importantly, feature inheritance can be explained by a 
model which was originally designed for a different pur-
pose, namely explaining feature-based attention and 
goal-directed visual search. Whether this also holds for 
temporal inheritance is yet unclear.
Second, two–process models of the emergence of 
stable percepts in the processing of fast spatio-tempo-
ral input sequences might explain the findings via the 
interaction of a fast feature coding process and a slower 
consciousness–related upgrading process. Two of these 
models, asynchronous updating (Scharlau & Neumann, 
2003a)  and  perceptual  retouch ( Bachmann,  1994), 
have  already  been  described  in  the  Introduction.  In 
addition, object substitution or updating might also be 
regarded as a two–process explanation (Enns, 2004). 
Assuming that the perceptual history of an object be-
gins with its entry into the reentrant process (not with 
the success of reentrant object formation), reentrant 
accounts could explain PLP; early visual coding would 
thus be the first process, reentrant hypothesis testing 
the second, higher process.
What is more, PLP might be used to infer the du-
ration of reentrant processes. If the interval between 252
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prime and mask is long enough to terminate establish-
ment of the prime’s object file, no PLP should be ex-
pected for the mask. Studies varying priming SOA and 
establishing the time course of PLP can provide such 
evidence (Scharlau et al. 2006; Scharlau & Neumann, 
2003b). It should be noted in passing, however, that 
the object–updating account might at present not be 
apt to explain why PLP is the same for masked as well 
as  non-masked  primes:  Non–masked  primes  should 
cause an object file of their own, separate from the 
mask’s object file, and in contrast to masked primes. 
None  of  the  two–process  models  is  very  specific 
about  the  processing  of  temporal  information.  The 
notion of two–process models suggests that the point 
in time at which higher–level processing of a stimulus 
(i.e.,  attention  or  upgrading)  starts  is  equivalent  to 
the perceived onset of the stimulus. If this hypothesis 
holds, the present experiments can be interpreted to 
indicate that this equivalency also holds for the interval 
between the onset of processing of the first and the 
onset of processing of the second stimulus on the one 
hand  and  the  perceived  interval  on  the  other  hand. 
However, the construct ‘time of perception’ is not nec-
essarily equivalent to the perception of time (for a gen-
eral discussion, see Neumann & Niepel, 2004). In fact, 
the AUM even argues that time of perception cannot 
be  operationalised  by  perception  of  time  (Neumann, 
1982).  My  above  argument  that  PLP  never  leads  to 
perceived simultaneity between asynchronous targets, 
not even if the amount of PLP exactly compensates for 
the asynchrony, might support this conclusion.
While two–process models are not sufficiently fle-
shed out to address this problem, inheritance explana-
tions (including the above interpretation of reentrant 
processing) do not suffer from a like ambiguity because 
they exclude the topic of time of processing and ex-
clusively address the topic of perceived time. In terms 
of a general theory of temporal perception, they are 
thus limited, as compared to two–process models, al-
though both types of model can equally well explain the 
present findings. 
Let  me  conclude  with  some  remarks  on  phenom-
enology. Studying the phenomenology of the masked 
as  well  as  the  masking  stimulus  was  a  prominent 
and natural method in early masking research (e.g., 
Werner, 1935). Observers reported what the prime (or 
mask) looked like. Only later was this method  aban-
doned  for  the  benefit  of  forced–choice  detection  or 
discrimination which, for instance, allowed discriminat-
ing between sensitivity and bias of the observer. These 
days, phenomenology sounds like a difficult, possibly 
philosophical and 19th century enterprise. Yet, this is 
not true. The present study aimed at showing that it 
is easy to assess the phenomenology of masking and 
that one can do this entirely within the realm of classi-
cal psychophysics. If the results are reliable, a masked 
prime changes the perceived onset of the mask on a 
quite general level, and it induces a non–simultaneous 
component  into  the  perception  of  the  mask  and  the 
standard stimulus even if the two are simultaneous. 
This is, of course, not a very rich phenomenology, but 
it is a first step towards a reorientation of masking re-
search on perception.
Appendix A
I used the nonlinear, rational function 
f(x) = a + b ×(1 - (1/(1+ c² × (x - d)²)))
and a least square regression for computing the pa-
rameters which are defined as follows.
Lmin =  d        (location of the minimum on the absci- 
                       ssa)
W   =  1 /     (width of opening)
Dmin =  a        (y-value of the minimum)
C    =  b + a (axis of convergence)
In this function, W is defined by the point of inflec-
tion on each branch of the U (the distance between the 
point of inflection and the location of the minimum). 
In logit analysis, DL gives the mean slope in the inner 
quartiles of the distribution, that is, between 0.5 and 
0.75. The point of inflection on the logistic curve is only 
marginally different from DL (0.78). W thus is numeri-
cally similar to DL.
Note that we used this function because of its prima 
facie fit with the data, not because of a theoretical rea-
son (as with the logistic function for the TOJ data). We 
first tested a reversed normal function with two ad-
ditional parameters (C and Dmin) which was not as good 
as the present one, but of course, empirical supremacy 
requires that more functions than two have been com-
pared. 
Thus, I cannot and indeed do not want to claim that 
this function is the best one for approximating scaling 
and reproduction data. It yields reasonable results, es-
pecially for the parameter of main interest, Lmin, and the 
overall quality of fit is acceptable (see Figures 3 and 4, 
right columns). This suffices for the aims of the present 
study, and the function should thus be regarded as a 
candidate for future validation. 
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Notes
1 In the study of Shore et al. (2001), latency facilita-
tion is termed “prior entry”, in accordance with a long–
standing  research  tradition  on  attentional  facilitation 
on  the  time  of  conscious  perception  (Wundt,  1887; 
see also Titchener, 1908). I do not use the term “prior 
entry” because it often refers to bimodal TOJ and at-
tention and rarely to control of attention by cues, and 
because it has not been related to the processing of 
non-conscious  information.  Also,  “prior  entry”  would 
suggest an attentional explanation of the phenomenon 
which is very likely but not established beyond discus-
sion (Scharlau, in press).
2 One participant’s approximation yielded a C value of 
more than 10,000 ms, which was omitted, see also the 
two W analyses in Experiment 1b.
3 Note that in the scaling task Dmin and C are defined by 
the scale (0–200), and not in ms.
4 It is possible to extend the regression of the psycho-
metric functions to additional parameters, for example, 
by including the two axes of convergence into the re-
gression and computing the PSS at the p value that lies 
exactly in between them. However, the psychometric 
distributions  of  the  present  experiments  show  that 
this is not necessary. In Experiment 1b, the functions 
doubtless converge to 0 and 1. In Experiment 1a, the 
convergence is slightly less clear, but still evident.
5 Pashler (1998) pointed out that much of the evidence 
of attentional facilitation may be due to an inhibitory 
mechanism which allows disregarding irrelevant infor-
mation,  that  is,  noise-reduction.  This  latter  account 
may explain the results of the TOJ task, because here 
it suffices to attend to the first stimulus and report its 
shape. However, it cannot as easily be applied to the 
other tasks, because estimating the interval requires 
comparing the onsets of both targets. It is thus im-
possible  to  block  or  disregard  information  from  the 
unprimed channel. Thus, noise-reduction cannot pos-
sibly account for PLP.
6 In order to corroborate this interpretation, I tested 
the Dmin values against zero in the two scaling tasks. 
In both experiments, no difference was found in the 
unprimed trials (both ts < 1). In primed trials, Dmin was 
larger than zero (both ts ≥ 3.41, both ps < .01). In the 
reproduction part, all Dmin values differed from zero (all 
ts ≥ 2.93, all ps < .05), in all likelihood because of dif-
ficulties in pressing the two mouse buttons at exactly 
the same time.
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